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House Bill 1131: An Enigma

By Robert E. Powell, Esq. & Catherine A. Potthast, Esq.

The 1988 General Assembly passed
House Bill 1131, which will be subject to
referendum in the November, 1988, general election. The overriding purpose of that
legislation was to reduce the crime rate or
incidence of violent crimes in the state
through the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of c.ertain handguns. It also
had an avowed secondary purpose of overruling the controversial decision of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Kelley v.
R. G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d
1143 (1985), by prohibiting the imposition
of strict liability for damages caused by the
criminal use of handguns.
While the Act repeals the vague and
potentially unconstitutional decision of
the court of appeals and does provide a
more reasonable method for the control of
firearms manufaCtured and sold in this
state, it is doubtful that it will have a far
reaching effect on either the crime rate or
the incidence of violent crimes.

Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc. - Judicial
Precursor of House Bill 1131
In Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md.
124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that a manufacturer or marketer of a "Saturday Night
Special" handgun could be held strictly
liable to persons who suffered gunshot
injuries from the criminal use of the handgun. The Kelley court was unable to clearly
define a "Saturday Night Special" handgun, and held that the determination was

to be made on case-by-case basis by a jury
considering
the gun's barrel length, concealability,
cost, quality of materials, quality of
manufacture, accuracy, reliability,
whether it has been banned from
import by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, and other
related characteristics. Additionally,
the industry standards, and the
understanding among law enforcement personnel, legislators and the
public, at the time the weapon was
manufactured and!or marketed by a
particular defendant, must be considered.

Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
The Kelley decision represented a novel
and unprecedented departure from established principles of product liability law.
Nearly every court considering this issue
had held, prior to the Kelley decision, that
a manufacturer of a properly functioning
handgun could not be held liable when a
third party intentionally used the gun in
the commission of criminal acts. E.g.,
Perkins v. F.1E. Corporation. 762 F.2d 1250
(5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington and
Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1984); Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608
F. Supp. 1206 (D. Tex. 1985); DeRosa v.
Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762
(E.D. N.Y. 1981); Bennet v. The Cincinnati
Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.
Ky. 1973); Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So.2d
98 (Fla. App. 1986); Rhodes v. R. G. Indus·

tries, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 51,325 S.E.2d 465
(1984); Riordan v. International Armament

Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d
1293 (1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc.,
299 Or. 551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985). These
courts recognized that strict liability is predicated upon the existence of a defect in a
product which causes injury to a plaintiff.
Regardless of the standard used to determine the existence of a defect, the courts
agreed that a functional handgun is not
defective solely by reason of the fact that
it may present a danger.
The Kelley court recognized that its
decision was not compatible with traditional principles of product liability law,
but nonetheless chose to fashion a new
cause of action against manufacturers of
"Saturday Night Specials" based upon its
perception of the public policy of the state.
See Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at
1159. 1
The Kelley decision has been criticized
by courts and commentators throughout
the country. E.g., Shipman v. Jennings Fire·
arms, 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986);
Moore v. R.G. Industries, 789 F.2d 1326
(9th Cir. 1986); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc.,
656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987); Brady v.
Hinckley, No. 82-0549 (D.D.C. 1986),
appeal pending, 815 F.2d 724 (D.c. Cir.
1987); Trespalacios v. Valor Corporation of
Florida, 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1986);
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751
(Mo. App. 1988); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry
and Loan. Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 748
P.2d 661 (1988). Robertson v. Grogan
(continued on page 10)
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(continued from page 7)
Investment Co., 710 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.
App. 1986). One serious flaw in the Kelley
decision concerns the lack of any meaningful standard as to what constitutes a
"Saturday Night Special." Without such a
standard, handgun manufacturers, distributors, and users are simply unable to determine what products, if used by criminals,
will subject them to liability. The "criteria" of "barrel length, concealability,
cost, quality of materials, quality of
manufacture, accuracy, reliability ... and
other related characteristics" are so vague
as to constitute no standard at all. The
Kelley decision fails to provide the type of
adequate criteria and standards required to
give manufacturers and consumers the
notice requisite to due process.
Moreover, the inadequate criteria and
standards provided impermissibly delegated basic policy matters to judges and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc subjective basis. "A statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must guess as to its
meaning and differ as to its application."
Lemberos v. Laurel Racecourse, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 1376, 1388 (D. Md. 1980). Although
the
constitutional
requirement
of
definiteness primarily arises in a criminal
context, the application of the "void-forvagueness" doctrine is not limited to such
a context, and can invalidate a civil "rule
or standard" as well as a statute. See gener·

ally Small Company v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 267 U.s. 233 (1925); Ciaccio
v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.s. 399 (1966). The
Kelley decision does not permit a person of
ordinary intelligence to ascertain with any
degree of precision which handguns are
prohibited, except in the extremes.
A second criticism of the Kelley decision
is its potential discriminatory effect. Insofar as the Kelley opinion seeks to outlaw
handguns on the basis of cost to the consumer, the opinion raises other questions.
First, the elimination of low cost guns
from the market may deprive a poor person of his ability to defend himself.
Second, because of the lower labor and
material costs in other countries, the Kelley
opinion may have the net effect of discriminating against alien manufacturers and
providing preferential treatment to
domestic manufacturers. Moreover, the
decision draws an irrational distinction
between victims shot with expensive guns
and those persons shot with low cost guns.
The cffect of the decision would be
to impose liability on some manufacturers, while not imposing liability on
others even though the handguns
manufactured or sold by all may be
used for criminal purposes. In short, it
would seem to be better for a potential
10-The Law Fonuul

victim to be shot or injured by [a]
cheap gun, than by an expensive one
because in the case of the former, the
victim could sue the manufacturer
who no doubt would have a deeper
pocket.
Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549 (D.D.C.
1986), appeal pending, 815 F.2d 724 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
Some critics further suggest that the
Kelley decision is inconsistent with federal
law and subject to federal preemption. The
sale and distribution of firearms is heavily
regulated on both the federal and state
levels. E.g., 18 U.S.c. 921-929 (1976). Section 907 of the Federal Firearms Act
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
prescribe rules and regulations pertaining
to the transport of firearms in Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)
promulgated detailed regulations pursuant
to this mandate. See 26 C.F.R. Parts 177178. These regulations have the effect of
placing manufacturers on notice as to the
nature of the weapons which may be
approved, and provide a means by which
a license and approval can be obtained.

UThe criteria. .. are
so vague as to
constitute no
standard at all."
The federal regulatory scheme is thus a
uniform mechanism by which weapons
manufacturers and sellers may market the
product. The need for uniformity of regulation is obvious when dealing with interstate and foreign commerce Manufacturers
and importers need to know what
weapons may be marketed.
The BATF regulations provide this uniformity and, indeed, provide a specific ruling on each and every model of gun. This
federal regulation thus delicately balances
the competing values of safety, commerce,
the right to bear arms, and uniformity in
laws. The doctrine of preemption precludes the States from upsetting this delicate balance established by federal law.
Federal law can preempt state law in three
ways. First, when enacting a federal statute, Congress may expressly state an
intent to preempt state law. E.g., Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
Second, even absent express preemptive
language, Congress may otherwise indicate

its intention to preempt state law by legislating so comprehensively that it has "left
no room for the states to supplement federal law." E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Finally,
even absent an express or implied intent
by Congress to preempt state law, state
law is preempted if the state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Kelley decision
potentially stands as an obstacle to the federal scheme of importation and commerce,
because it requires jurors, on a case-by-case
basis, to make the determination of which
handguns are marketable and which are
not. Nothing in Kelley prohibits two juries
from making inconsistent proclamations
on the same model gun. The rule set forth
in Kelley is thus arguably preempted by
federal law.

HOUSE BILL

1131: Kelley's Aftermath

House Bill 1131 was enacted in response
to the Kelley decision. Although the Bill
attempts to correct some of the deficiencies in the Kelley opinion, questions as to
its net effect remain unanswered. Moreover, it is unlikely that the bill will have the
effect of reducing the incidence of violent
cnme.
The bill's preamble articulates the General Assembly's finding that "certain handguns have no legitimate socially useful
purpose and are not suitable for law
enforcement, self-protection, or sporting
activities," and sets forth its intention to
"remove these handguns from the streets
of this state." To that end, the bill establishes a "Handgun Roster Board," consisting of nine members appointed by the
Governor. The Board members are to
include the Superintendent of the
Maryland State Police, and representatives
of the Association of Chiefs of Police, the
Maryland State's Attorneys' Association,
handgun manufacturers, the Maryland
Chapter of The National Rifle Association
Marylanders against Handgun Abuse, and
three citizen members. The Board is charged with the responsibility of compiling a
handgun roster of permitted handguns
that are "useful for legitimate sporting,
self-protection, or law enforecement purposes."
The bill requires the Board, in compiling
the roster, to consider the following characteristics:
"concealability,
ballistic
accuracy, weight, quality of materials,
quality of manufacture, reliability as to
safety, caliber, detectability by security
equipment, and utility for legitimate sporting activities, self-protection, or law
enforcement." These factors are no less
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vague, and are, nearly identical to the "c~i
teria" adopted by the Court of ~ppeals I~
the Kelley decision. The sole difference IS
that the criteria of "low cost" has been
eliminated from the factors to be considered by the Board. Cost may, however,
enter into the question inadvertendy by
virtue of consideration of the quality of
materials and manufacture.
The procedure for gaining app~oval of
handguns is specified by the bIll, and
allows a person to petition for a specified
handgun inclusion on the approv~d rost~r.
A petitioner whose handgun IS dented
placement on the list may request a. he~
ing, and may appeal an adverse rullO~ ~n
accordance with the Maryland Admlntstrative Procedure Act. Rulemaking
authority to carry out the provisions C?f
the act is granted to the Secretary of PublIc
Safety and Correctional Services.
The Act overrules the Kelley decision
which imposed civil tort strict liability
upon a handgun manufacturer ~or the
criminal use of a handgun by a thIrd per- .
son and instead, substitutes criminal
pen'alties for manufacturing, dist~ibuting,
or selling handguns that are not lOcluded
on the approved roster. The maxim~m
fine under the Act is $10,000 for each VIOlation. Each handgun sold, manufactured
or distributed is considered a seperate violation. In addition, the bill enables the
Superintendent of the Maryland State
Police to obtain a temporary or permanent
injuction precluding the manufacture or
sale of handguns not included on the han~
gun roster. Surprisingly, there is no specIfic prohibition in the Act on the use of
non-approved handguns. 2
Bill 1131 thus attempts to correct some
of the deficiences in the Kelley decision. By
establishing a handgun roster in advance of
marketing and sale, it attempts to add the
elements of certainty and notice lacking in
the Kelley decision. No longer will juries
make an ad hoc and subjective determination of approved handguns, an approach
which can only lead to inconsistent results.
The ad hoc and subjective application of
the . Kelley criteria is instead delegated to
the Board. The fact that one rule making
body has been substituted may lead to
more consistency, provided the Board
does not act in an arbitrary fashion. The
manner in which the Board interprets and
applies the prescribed factors will determine whether the General Assembly has
successfully overcome the flaws inherent
in the Kelley decision.
There still remain many unanswered
questions concerning the effect of the Act,
and whether the roster or regulations
under the Act are preempted by Federal
law. Much depends upon the manner in
which the Board applies the factors designated in the bill to specific handguns.

Questions to be addressed in evaluaing the
roster and the regulations to be promulgated under the Act are whether there
is consistency between similar handguns ~f
different manufacturers, whether there IS
any pattern of approval in favor of
domestic manufacturers, 3 and the extent to
which the Roster is consistent with, or
contrary to the regulations promulgated
by the BATF.
The rulemaking power granted pursuant
to the Act potentially can clarify the vague
"criteria" set forth in the Act, and perhaps
preclude a successful "void-for-vagueness"
challenge to the Act. The Secre!ary shoul?
adopt comprehensive .re~latlons s~e~l
fically defining the cnterIa for balhstlc
accuracy, permissive weight, caliber ~d
the parameters for the quality of materIals
and manufacture. It is suggested that, to
avoid challenges to the Act on preemption
grounds any such regulations adopted follow the ~pplicable BATF regulations. Such
an approach would preclude inconsistency
between state and federal regulation and
would ease the burden on the free flow of
interstate commerce.
It is interesting that in all of the arguments presented in favor of this bill by the
Office of the Attorney General and
various police organizations, no reference
has been made to any definitive studies
which support a theory that inexpensive,
poorly made and inaccurate handguns are
preferred by criminals. To the contrary,
recognized criminologists have demonstrated that the majority of guns used in
the commission of crimes, especially street
crimes, are stolen and are of good quality.
E.g., Wright and Rossi, Armed and Con·
sidered Dangerous (1985); Brill, The Traffic
(Legal and Illegal) in Guns, Harper's, Sept.
1977 at 37-44. In fact, while it is far from
definitive, a cursory review of recent newspaper releases, where reference is made to
the weapon, reveals that good quality
weapons are preferred.
Both the Kelley decision and House Bill

"the majority of guns
used in. .. crimes
are stolen and are of
good quality."
1131 seek to remove from the streets
"Saturday Night Specials." Aside from the
fact that there is no true definition of a
"Saturday Night Special," neither
addresses the real issue which is the misuse
of firearms. Banning the manufacture or

sale of handguns, regardless of the description, only places a prohibition upon manufacturers and merchants. It does not preclude the importation of handguns, nor
does it impose any penalties on the theft o.f
guns. All that this bill does is to theoretIcally reduce the number of gun.s a~ailable
on the legitimate market. WhIle Its language may be sufficient to encompass the
black market, there certainly is no practical means of policing such activity.
In actuality, House Bill 1131 simply precludes the marketing of defective or unreliable handguns. The regulations of the
Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms already prescribe specific criteria
for accomplishing that end. Most of the
criteria suggested by the bill are addressed
to functionability, quality of manufacture,
and safety of the user. While concealability
and detectability are referred to, those
characteristics become superfluous when
considerations of self-protection and law
enforcement are injected into the equation.
In summary, although the Act does
attempt to remedy the gross deficiencies ~n
the Kelley opinion, it is unlikely to fulfIll
its primary purpose.
FOOTNOTES
I Kelley never addressed whether the handgun at issue was a "Saturday Night Special" under its articulation. In fact, the gun
at issue was a 38 Special, similar in size and
caliber to a police revolver.
2 Other Maryland statutes, however, provide criminal penalties for weapon related
crimes. E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 36E
(1) (1987); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 36G
(b) (1987); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 488
(1987); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §445 (c)
(1987).
3 The bill specifies that the Board member
representative of the gun manufacturing
industry be "preferably a manufacturer
from the State."
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